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Abstract
In March 2000, European leaders met in Lisbon, Portugal, to consider the state of the Eu-
ropean economy. While there had been economic growth in Europe in the 1990s, it had been
consistently lower than that of the European Union’s (“EU” or “Union”) main competitors, with
unemployment levels remaining stubbornly high. Determined to blaze a new course in Europe,
Heads of State and Government announced that “the Union has [today] set itself a new strategic
goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”
These conclusions on economic reform contained a range of policies to stimulate key sectors of
the European economy. Delivering this major goal would mean that the EU needed to equip itself
with efficient, transparent, and above all, integrated European financial markets. To achieve this,
European leaders called for the implementation of the European Commission’s 1999 Financial
Services Action Plan by 2005. This target was as ambitious as it was essential, recognizing the
fundamental strategic importance of integrated European financial markets for the whole European
economy. The economic benefits of improving companies’ access to investment capital and en-
couraging investors in such an integrated market were seen as central to its achievement. Attention
has focused on the importance of achieving higher levels of harmonization of regulations in secu-
rities markets. Although turnover on European stock exchanges reached record levels at the end
of the 1990s, capital markets remained regulated by essentially outmoded EU legislation, some
of which dates back two decades. This is one of the main reasons why levels of capitalization of
European stock exchanges have remained considerably below those of the U.S. markets. And de-
spite the 1992 deadline for completion of the EU’s internal market and the fact that many Member
States had modernized their market regulations in the 1990s, little had changed at the European
level to create a true level playing field. Against this background, and in order to achieve the ambi-
tious goal set at the Lisbon summit, in July 2000, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers
established a high level group of independent figures, the Committee of Wise Men, chaired by
Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, to develop fresh thinking on the reform of the regulatory process
for securities. The European Institutions in the course of 2001 endorsed their proposals, and their
application is now being extended from securities to all financial services sectors in the Union.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2000, European leaders met in Lisbon, Portugal,
to consider the state of the European economy. While there had
been economic growth in Europe in the 1990s, it had been con-
sistently lower than that of the European Union's ("EU" or
"Union") main competitors, with unemployment levels remain-
ing stubbornly high. Determined to blaze a new course in Eu-
rope, Heads of State and Government announced that "the
Union has [today] set itself a new strategic goal for the next dec-
ade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion."1 These con-
clusions on economic reform contained a range of policies to
stimulate key sectors of the European economy. Delivering this
major goal would mean that the EU needed to equip itself with
efficient, transparent, and above all, integrated European finan-
cial markets. To achieve this, European leaders called for the
implementation of the European Commission's 1999 Financial
Services Action Plan by 2005.2 This target was as ambitious as it
was essential, recognizing the fundamental strategic importance
of integrated European financial markets for the whole Euro-
pean economy. The economic benefits of improving compa-
nies' access to investment capital and encouraging investors in
such an integrated market were seen as central to its achieve-
ment. Attention has focused on the importance of achieving
higher levels of harmonization of regulations in securities mar-
kets. Although turnover on European stock exchanges reached
record levels at the end of the 1990s, capital markets remained
* The author was Director-General of the Internal Market Directorate-General of
the European Commission between 1993 and September 2002. All views expressed in
this Article are strictly personal.
1. See Lisbon European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U.BULL., no. 3, at 7
(2000), [hereinafter Lisbon Presidency conclusions], available at http://europa.eu.int/
council/off/conclu/.
2. See European Commission, Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Ac-
tion Plan, COM (99) 232 Final (June 1999) [hereinafter FSAP].
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regulated by essentially outmoded EU legislation, some of which
dates back two decades. This is one of the main reasons why
levels of capitalization of European stock exchanges have re-
mained considerably below those of the U.S. markets.' And de-
spite the 1992 deadline for completion of the EU's internal mar-
ket and the fact that many Member States had modernized their
market regulations in the 1990s, little had changed at the Euro-
pean level to create a true level playing field. Against this back-
ground, and in order to achieve the ambitious goal set at the
Lisbon summit, in July 2000, the Council of Economic and Fi-
nance Ministers established a high level group of independent
figures, the Committee of Wise Men, chaired by Baron Alexan-
dre Lamfalussy, to develop fresh thinking on the reform of the
regulatory process for securities. The European Institutions in
the course of 2001 endorsed their proposals, and their applica-
tion is now being extended from securities to all financial ser-
vices sectors in the Union.
I. THE EU INTERNAL MARKET
The Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty" or "Treaty") entrusts the Community with the task of
promoting the harmonious development of economic activities,
a continuous and balanced expansion, increased stability, a
rapid rise in living standards, and closer relations among its
Member States.4 Achieving a fully Internal Market in the Union
requires the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital among Member States,
thereby improving efficiency by securing a better allocation of
economic resources.5 The Internal Market is the economic basis
of the EU. It currently comprises a market of 370 million con-
3. European stock markets remain about half of the size of those in the United
States.
4. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art.
59, O.J. C 340/3, at 200 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 62 (ex art. 73f) [hereinafter Consolidated
EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on
European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain re-
lated acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]
(amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
5. See id. art. 251, O.J. C 34 0 /3, at 279-80 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 141-42 (ex art. 189b).
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sumers and could expand to nearly 500 million in the next wave
of enlargement. It constitutes an incomparable source of oppor-
tunities for European business and industries and provides the
stimulus for Europe's quest for global competitiveness. The In-
ternal Market is a highly successful European initiative that is at
the very heart of economic and political integration. The bene-
ficiaries of a rising economic prosperity are Europe's businesses
and citizens, with consumers enjoying a wider range of goods
and services, usually at lower prices. The Internal Market also
delivers a corpus of rights, which citizens and businesses can di-
rectly invoke to allow them to work and to move freely through-
out the Union. It is based on a set of rules either deriving di-
rectly from the Treaty (primary legislation) or from secondary
legislation adopted by the Council and the Parliament on the
basis of proposals from the Commission. This legal framework is
the key to the Internal Market's success. Economic advantages
can be fully exploited only if the legal framework is complete,
coherent, up-to-date, and well implemented. These rules go be-
yond the strictly economic domain. To establish an area without
internal frontiers, to allow the free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital, common (harmonized) rules are a must.
These are designed to achieve an equivalent level of protection
with respect to a number of general interest objectives including
the protection of consumers,6 the environment,7 and the sus-
tainability of the so-called European Social Model. This bal-
anced approach seeks to remove obstacles to free movement
while at the same time ensuring a high level of protection of
public interest objectives. It is the basis for the Union's ambi-
tions agreed upon at Lisbon.' Over time, many hundreds of di-
rectives and regulations have been adopted by the Institutions of
the European Community ("EC" or "Community") and applied
by its Member States. The measures already adopted relate inter
6. See id. art. 153(2), O.J. C 340/3, at 248 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 110 (ex art. 129a)
(requiring "consumer protection requirements" to be "taken into account" in all other
Community policies and actions).
7. See id. art. 6, O.J. C 340/3, at 183 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 45 (ex art. 3c) (requiring
"environmental protection requirements" to be "integrated into the definition and im-
plementation of ... Community policies and activities").
8. See Lisbon Presidency conclusions, supra n.1; see also Commission Communica-
tion, Realising the European Union's Potential: Consolidating and Extending the Lisbon Strat-
egy, COM (2001) 79 Final (Feb. 2001); Commission Communication, The Lisbon Strategy
- Making Change Happen, COM (2002) 14 Final (Jan. 2002).
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alia to the liberalization of public procurement; the harmoniza-
tion of taxation; the liberalization of capital markets and finan-
cial services; the progress in standardization of products; the re-
moval of technical and physical barriers (elimination of border
checks) inhibiting the free movement of individuals; and the lib-
eralization of services (telecommunications, energy, and so on)
representing more than seventy percent of the Union's Gross
National Product ("GNP").
Given that the Internal Market is evolving, modifications
and improvements to its policies will need to continually be in-
troduced. Four key challenges lie ahead. First, the legal frame-
work is incomplete: in some sectors, there is, in effect, no Inter-
nal Market because some (or all) of the necessary rules have not
been fully adopted. This is typically the case not only in the area
of financial services, but also in services generally. Second, given
such changes and the emergence of new concerns, questions
arise as to how far legislation is able to respond to the pace of
change in society and to the markets. It is doubtful whether the
EU's existing legislative model will be able to deliver a response
that matches the pace of change and the huge demands that
enlargement will place on it. Third, existing rules are the ac-
cumulation of many decades of legislation. Successive amend-
ments have often rendered that legislation overly complex and
difficult for "end users" to understand and implement. A deter-
mined effort of simplification at both, national and EU level, is
needed for both, present and future legislation. The Commis-
sion's recently adopted ambitious package of measures on "bet-
ter regulation" was precisely targeted to meet these challenges.'
Finally, no amount of rule-making can work if the rules them-
selves are not well implemented. This task falls to the Member
States and their national courts, but Community Institutions,
and in particular the Commission as guardian of the Treaty, also
have major responsibilities to secure effective implementation.
9. See Commission Communication, European Governance: Better Lawmaking, COM
(2002) 275 Final (May 2002); Commission Communication, Simplifying and Improving
the Regulatory Framework, COM (2002) 278 Final (June 2001); Commission Communica-
tion on Impact Assessment, COM (2002) 276 Final (June 2002); Commission Commu-
nication, Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue, COM (2002) 277 Final
(June 2002).
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II. THE EU'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The EU is built on a unique institutional system. Fifteen
Member States have pooled sovereignty for certain matters and
placed it in the hands of independent European Institutions,
which represent the interests of the Union as a whole, its mem-
ber countries, and its citizens. The European Court and Euro-
pean Commission traditionally uphold the interests of the
Union as a whole. Each national government is represented
within the Council of Ministers, and citizens directly elect the
European Parliament. Democracy and the rule of law are there-
fore the cornerstones of the EU's structure. 0 The Commission
has been seen as the driving force of European integration,
given its right of initiative and its role as guardian of the Treaty.
That exclusive right of initiative is exercised not only in relation
to legislation, but also with respect to the EU's budget and inter-
national agreements. This means that as a general rule, the
Council and the European Parliament adopt legislation only on
the basis of a Commission proposal, and that at any time during
the procedures, the Commission can amend or, if it considers it
necessary, withdraw its proposal." The Council of Ministers is
composed of one representative from each Member State, who is
empowered to commit his Government.' 2 Which national Minis-
ters attend each Council meeting depends on the subject dis-
cussed, but this does not affect the institutional unity of the
Council. One of the main responsibilities of the Council is to act
as the Community's legislative body. For issues concerning the
Internal Market, this legislative power is shared with the Euro-
pean Parliament under the "co-decision" procedure (see below).
Elected every five years by direct universal suffrage, the Euro-
10. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6, O.J. C 340/
2, at 153 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 45 (ex art. 3c) (stating that "[t]he Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, the respect of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, and the role of law, principles which are common to the Member States") [here-
inafter Consolidated TEU], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra
n.4.
11. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.4, art. 250-52, O.J. C 340/3, at 279-81
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 141-43 (ex art. 189a-c) (governing various types of legislative proce-
dure, which gives the Commission power of legislative initiative); see also art. 250(2),
O.J. C 340/3, at 279 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 141 (ex art. 189a) (stipulating that the Com-
mission may alter its proposal for legislation at any time before final action by the Coun-
cil).
12. See id. art. 203, O.J. C 340/3, at 264 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 126 (ex art. 146).
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pean Parliament is the expression of the democratic will of the
Union's citizens." The Maastricht Treaty of 199214 and the Am-
sterdam Treaty of 19971- have considerably increased the power
and influence of the European Parliament, which has been
transformed from a purely consultative body into a legislative
Parliament. Brought together within pan-European political
groups, all the major political parties operating in the Member
States are represented. The most common legislative procedure
is called "co-decision," which places the European Parliament
and the Council on an equal footing in relation to the adoption
of joint Council and Parliament acts. 16 If the two Institutions
disagree, a conciliation committee is convened to seek a com-
promise. 17 This co-decision procedure is used for the adoption
of Internal Market legislation and, more specifically, legislation
in the field of financial services. The legislative instruments are
usually directives and - far less frequently in the area of the
Internal Market - regulations. A directive is binding as to the
result to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is ad-
dressed, but leaves to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods.'" A regulation has general application, it is bind-
ing in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.' 9
A. Comitology
In accordance with the EC Treaty, the co-legislators may
confer on the Commission, in the acts they adopt, powers for the
implementation of the rules they have laid down, including cer-
13. See id. art. 190, O.J. C 340/3, at 260-61 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 122-23 (ex art. 138).
14. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. 224/1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R.
719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single
European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. The
Treaty on European Union ("TEU") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra
n.4. These amendments were incorporated into the TEU, and the articles of the TEU
were renumbered in the Consolidated TEU, supra n.10.
15. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra n.4.
16. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.4, art. 251, OJ. C 340/3, at 279-80 (1997),
37 I.L.M. at 141-42 (ex art. 189b). See also GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGERJ. GOEBEL, WIL-
LIAMJ. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW ch. 3
(2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter GOEBEL, ET.AL.] (generally describing Community legislation
and legislative process, notably co-decision procedure).
17. See id. art. 251 (4),(5) and (6), O.J. C 340/3, at 280 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 142 (ex
art. 189b).
18. See id. art. 249, O.J. C 340/3, at 278 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 140 (ex art. 189).
19. See id.
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tain requirements, which may be imposed with respect to the
exercise of these powers.2 0 In practice, this means that every le-
gal act, directive or regulation indicates the extent of imple-
menting powers conferred upon the Commission and the way in
which the Commission must exercise them. A committee always
assists the Commission in the exercise of any such implementing
powers. The rules governing the work of these committees have
been established in accordance with pre-established models in
Council Decision No. 1999/468/EC ("Comitology Decision"). 2
The Comitology Decision provides certain criteria for the choice
of committee procedures. "Regulatory committees" are estab-
lished when the Commission is empowered to adopt implement-
ing measures of general scope designed to apply the essential
provisions of the basic instrument, and/or measures designed to
adapt or update its non-essential provisions. The Comitology
Decision also simplifies the requirements in the exercise of im-
plementing powers conferred on the Commission and defines
how the European Parliament is involved (an issue on which
there is now considerable controversy), including improvements
to the information flow to the European Parliament.2 2 The
Commission is required to inform the Parliament on a regular
basis of committee proceedings and transmit to it documents re-
lated to the activities of the committees. These comitology com-
mittees are also a place for discussion and technical advice.
Chaired by the Commission, they are comprised exclusively of
Member State representatives. The Commission thus has the op-
portunity to discuss implementing measures with national ad-
ministrations before their adoption. In this way, the Commis-
sion has the possibility of adapting the implementing measures
to the legal and technical realities of each Member State.
20. See id. art. 202, O.J. C 340/3, at 264 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 126 (ex art. 145).
21. See Council Decision No. 1999/468/EC, O.J. L 184/23 (1999) (replacing
Council Decision No. 87/373/EEC, Oj. L 197/33 (July 13, 1987).
22. See id. If the Parliament considers that a proposed implementing measure ex-
ceeds the implementing powers given to the Commission, it will inform the Council of
its position. The Council will then decide whether it agrees or opposes the draft mea-
sure. If the Council does not react within three months, the Commission will adopt the
draft implementing measure. Cf Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regula-
tion of European Securities Markets, 2001, at 41, art. 5 (2001), available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en/finances/banks/wisemen.htm [hereinafter
Comitology Report].
[Vol. 26:58
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B. Better Governance
In July 2001, the Commission presented its White Paper on
European Governance ("Governance White Paper").23 Its basic
message was simple and is as topical today as it was then: "We,
European Institutions and the Member States, need to govern
ourselves better - together." That objective could be achieved
without changing the Treaty and without (necessarily) awaiting
the successful outcome of a new intergovernmental conference.
Better governance calls for an active co-operation between the
European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the na-
tional governments, so that the people of Europe can more
clearly see how they themselves relate to major projects and the
Union's day-to-day business. The richness of the "Community
method" is that it produces rules that are legally certain and can
be applied in any national context. However, there are many
complex issues at stake in enacting good European legislation,
which succeeds in taking appropriate account of the principles
of subsidiarity and proportionality. Citizens take an interest in
the effectiveness of the rules handed down "from Brussels" and
the way they are drawn up.24 The advent of a European demo-
cratic conscience strengthens the need for accountability and
proportionality in the way powers vested in the European Institu-
tions are exercised. This need is expressed more especially in
the demands for transparency, clarity, and a willingness to be
subject to scrutiny.
The European Parliament has, for its part, stressed the pri-
macy of political accountability behind any legislative action,
bringing out the need for more transparent, equitable, and
broad consultation. It is the very nature of the legislative pro-
cess, which is now under scrutiny and debate in the Union.
There has been criticism that past directives have tended to
regulate in too great detail. The Commission is therefore in-
creasingly reflecting the original definition of the directive as
laid down in the Treaty, whereby, as far as possible, directives are
general in nature and cover the objectives, periods of validity,
and essential aspects of legislation. It will be for the co-legisla-
23. See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001)
428 Final (Jul. 2001) [hereinafter Governance White Paper].
24. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.4, art. 5, O.J. C 340/3, at 182-83 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 44-45 (ex art. 3b).
2002]
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tors to decide under what form the essential aspects will appear
in their initial policy decision, and to ensure that the technicali-
ties and details are a matter for executive measures.
Targeting directives in this way (with the consequences, inter
alia, of simplifying legislation) can be achieved without under-
mining the legislative prerogatives of the European Parliament
and the Council. Indeed, those Institutions will be able, more
effectively, to concentrate their discussions on the fundamental
aspects of legislation.
C. EU Decision-Making for Financial Services
The European Commission's Governance White Paper and the
discussions that followed it clearly show the importance that Eu-
ropean Institutions, national governments, businesses and indi-
vidual European citizens attach to the issue. All sides agree that
reform of the whole EU legislative process is essential. The key
issue is how that can be achieved. In financial services, the pic-
ture is somewhat different. Reform, both, of policies and of the
mechanisms needed to agree those policies, is well underway
driven by the fundamental changes that are occurring in the sec-
tor. From a policy perspective, the critical moment in this pro-
cess was the adoption of the Financial Services Action Plan in
1999 ("FSAP"). Since then, progress in implementing the FSAP
has been considerable. At the time of writing, three quarters of
the forty-five priority actions presented in the FSAP have been
completed.25 In financial services, the EU has not moved away
from the Internal Market's basic concepts: direct applicability of
the Internal Market freedoms; the principle of mutual recogni-
tion in the shape of a single European passport for credit institu-
tions, insurance, and investment service providers; and co-ordi-
nation among the Member States on the basis of the home coun-
try control. 26 These concepts have been extended, made more
effective and better implemented.
25. See FSAP, supra n.2.
26. These basic concepts were set out in the Commission White Paper on Completing
the Internal Market, COM (85) Final 310 Uune 1985). For a general description of the
White Paperand the Internal Market program, see GOEBEL, ET.AL., supra n.16, at ch.14 B,
Sec. 1.
[Vol. 26:58
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES
1. Basic Concepts
The basic Treaty provisions on the freedom of establish-
ment and the free provision of services prohibit restrictions on
the access to, or the exercise of, economic activities by self-em-
ployed persons and companies in a Member State other than the
Member State of origin.2' These freedoms confer far-reaching
rights on the businesses established in the EU: they prohibit not
only discrimination on grounds of nationality or the seat of a
company, but any restriction, even if applied without distinction
to national financial services providers and to those of other
Member States, to the extent that such restrictions may prohibit,
impede, or render less advantageous their economic activities.
However, in accordance with established case law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, such "indistinctly-applica-
ble" restrictions can be justified by overriding reasons of general
interest. Such a justification requires the proof that restrictions
are appropriate to achieve the objective that they pursue and do
not go beyond what is strictly necessary in order to attain that
objective.28 What does the prohibition of restrictions to the In-
ternal Market freedoms mean? A Member State is required to
recognize the legal status of a financial service provider coming
from elsewhere in the Union. Specific derogations from this
principle of mutual recognition are, however, daily practice in
all Member States. In the absence of more precise Community
legislation to co-ordinate national legislation, each Member
State is able, with relative ease, to justify non-discriminatory na-
tional restrictions 29 on the basis of overriding concerns. Such
justification includes consumer and investor protection, 3° pro-
tection of market stability,31 and maintenance of the good repu-
27. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.4, arts. 43, 49, O.J. C 340/3, at 195, 197
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 57, 59 (ex arts. 52, 59) (describing free provision of services).
28. See Gebhard v. Consiglio dell' Ordine degli Avvocatie di Milano, Case 55/94
[1995] E.C.R. 1-4165; Ramrath v. Ministre de la Justice, Case 106/91 [1992] E.C.R. I-
3351; Sager v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., Case C-76/90 [1991] E.C.R. 1-4221.
29. Restrictions that are not based on grounds of nationality of the economic oper-
ator concerned.
30. See Societ6 Civile Immobiliere Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bay et Cie, Case
222/95 [1996] E.C.R. 1-3899; Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84 [1986] E.C.R.
3755.
31. See Commission v. Italy, Case11/94 [1996] ECR 1-2691 (discussing securities
dealers).
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tation of the financial sector.3 2 For reasons such as these, Com-
munity legislation supplemented mutual recognition by intro-
ducing close co-ordination of financial market supervision in the
1980s. This is not the place to describe the entire Community
legislation on credit institutions33 and insurance. 4  Directives
are built on the principle of mutual recognition: a Member State
where a financial service provider is established grants the au-
thorization necessary to take up and pursue the service pro-
vider's activities. The conditions for such authorization are in
essence laid down in Community legislation. In effect, rather
than a complex procedure, the authorization given acts as a "sin-
gle passport" that all other Member States must recognize. Mu-
tual recognition thus allows financial service providers to open a
branch or to exercise their activities across national borders
while the home Member State of the service provider remains
responsible for the control and supervision of its activities.
III. COMMUNITY LEGISLATION ON SECURITIES MARKETS
Since the end of the 1970s, legislation has opened the way
for European companies to raise capital on securities markets in
other Member States. Coordination among Member States was
intended to lead to a minimum level of investor protection while
limiting the possibilities for host Member States to impose local
requirements on those companies. These directives coordinated
the conditions for admission of securities to official stock mar-
kets35 and introduced a single passport system for the drawing
32. See Alpine Investment, Case 384/93 [1995] ECR 1-1141 (discussing prohibition
of "cold calling" potential clients for investment in commodities).
33. See Directive No. 2000/12/EC, O.J. L 126, at 1 (2000) (relating to taking up
and pursuit of business of credit institutions). This codified and combined Council
Directive No. 77/780/EEC (1977) (relating to the taking up and pursuit of business
credit institutions), Council Directive No. 89/299/EEC (1992) (relating to funds of
credit institutions), Council Directive No. 89/647/EEC (1992) (relating to solvency ra-
tio for credit institutions), Council Directive No. 92/30/EEC (1992) (relating to super-
visions of credit institutions on consolidated basis, and Council Directive No. 92/121/
EEC (relating to monitoring and control of large exposures of credit institutions).
34. See Council Directive No. 79/267/EEC, O.J. L 63 at 1 (1979) (relating to tak-
ing up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance), amended &y Council Directive
No. 90/619/EEC, O.J. L 330, at 50 (1990). See Council Directive No. 73/239/EEC, O.1.
L 228, at 3 (1973) (relating to direct insurance other than life insurance), amended by
Council Directive No. 88/357/EEC, O.J. L 172, at 1 (1988), amended by Council Direc-
tive No. 92/49/EEC, 0.J.L 228, at 1 (1992).
35. See Council Directive No. 79/279/EEC, O.J. L 66, at 21 (1979) (codified in
Council Directive No. 2001/34/EC, O.J. L 184, at 1 (2001).
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up, scrutiny, and distribution of the relevant prospectus to be
provided to the public prior to the admission of securities to
trading on stock exchanges. 6 Directive No. 89/298/EEC com-
pleted this framework with respect to public offer of securities,7
and Directive No. 82/121/EEC set up minimum regular report-
ing standards for information of investors imposed upon compa-
nies whose securities are traded on stock exchanges. 8 Despite
the level of harmonization achieved by these directives, a num-
ber of barriers remained notably because only minimum re-
quirements were harmonized. Member States could make use of
the many options and exceptions with the result that implemen-
tation was quite divergent. The result was fifteen different sets of
legislation and hence, a major fragmentation of European secur-
ities (especially retail) markets. Thus, Union legislation does
not provide a fully developed regulatory framework for second-
tier markets, such as the Nouveau Marchi in Paris, or the Neuer
Markt in Frankfurt, and also allows each Member State to impose
its national language when securities are offered to its nationals
on its stock exchange. Companies wanting to raise capital
throughout the Union are thus required to translate the relevant
information (the prospectus) into the eleven official languages.
Faced by such obstacles and the many different national require-
ments, many European companies often consciously choose not
to enter securities markets in other Member States. In other di-
rectives that cover the integrity and stability of securities markets
similar inconsistencies reinforced market fragmentation. Direc-
tive No. 89/592/EEC ("Insider Dealing Directive") provides for
a minimum set of rules to protect investors against insider deal-
ers by security issuers and financial intermediaries."9 Innovative
and sophisticated capital markets have, however, rarely allowed
36. See Council Directive No. 80/390/EEC, Oj. L 100, at 1 (1980) (coordinating
the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny, and distribution of listing particulars to
be published for admission of securities to official stock exchange listing), amended by
Council Directive No. 94/18/EC, O.J. L 135, at 1 (1994) (codified in Directive No.
2001/34/EC).
37. See Council Directive No. 89/298/EEC, O.J. L 124, at 8 (1989) (coordinating
the requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny, and distribution of the prospectus to be
published when transferable securities are offered to the public).
38. See Council Directive No. 82/121/EEC, O.J. L 48, at 26 (1982) (discussing in-
formation to be published on a regular basis by companies whose shares have been
admitted to official stock-exchange, listing) (codified in Directive 2001/34/EC).
39. See Council Directive No. 89/592/EEC, O.J. L 339, at 30 (1989) (relating to
insider dealing).
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the pursuit of possible insider dealings. Similarly, some Member
States have introduced rules on market manipulation (for exam-
ple on the dissemination of false information) in the 1990s,
while others have not. On market transparency, Council Direc-
tive No. 88/627/EEC ("Major Holdings Directive") introduced
Community requirements for investors to inform the issuer of
major acquisitions on the disposal of holdings in security issuers
(subsequently the issuer has to inform the public). 4° The cur-
rent thresholds of major holdings requiring information to the
markets start at ten percent of the voting rights - yet most
Member States have introduced much stricter disclosure rules.
The taking up and the pursuit of a whole range of investment
services, such as the activities of brokers, dealers, and underwrit-
ers, is also covered in Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC ("Invest-
ment Services Directive" or "ISD").41 Before adoption, ISD had
already been the subject of a number of difficult political com-
promises. While a single European passport for investment ser-
vice providers was introduced, a number of important questions
were left unresolved: these include the harmonization of "con-
duct of business rules" to allow mutual recognition of investment
service providers' licenses and the absence of a clear distinction
between professional and retail investors. Furthermore, phe-
nomena such as Alternative Trading Systems and the "internal-
ization" of orders through banks4 2 have overtaken the approach
originally adopted in the ISD.
A. Overhauling Securities Legislation
To contribute toward a greater integration of European
markets and to respond to the impact of major innovation and
technological changes in the way securities markets work re-
quired a new approach at European level. Existing legislation
was often out of date since the legislative approach could not
match the pace of market change and the evolution of complex,
40. See Council Directive No. 88/627/EEC, O.J. L 348, at 62 (1988) (describing
the information to be published when a major holding in a listed company is acquired
or disposed of).
41. See Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, O.J. L 141 at 27 (1993) (relating to in-
vestment services in the securities field).
42. See Commission Communication, Upgrading the Investment Services Directive No.
93/22/EEC, COM (2000) 729 Final (Nov. 2000).
[Vol. 26:58
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES
innovative market instruments.43 The deadlines set in the FSAP
were unachievable unless a new approach was found. Member
States also expressed concerns about the lack of consistent im-
plementation of Community legislation. At the end of the
1990s, more than forty public bodies with very different struc-
tures were responsible at Member State level for supervising the
securities markets. Thus, reform was needed to ensure consis-
tent implementation and a convergence of the structures and
responsibilities of regulatory and supervisory authorities. This
was the picture in the Union's securities markets. In other finan-
cial services sectors (notably banking, financial conglomerates
and insurance) there were fewer problems but here, too, the
pace of change was beginning to put great stress on the legisla-
tive system while new developments (such as the growing market
share of financial conglomerates) increasingly blurred tradi-
tional distinctions between financial services sectors and the leg-
islations that covered them.
B. Regulatory Reform in Financial Service
The Committee of' Wise Men under Baron Alexandre
Lamfalussy" was asked to focus on the functioning of regulatory
processes for securities at the level of the EU and to identify and
provide solutions to weaknesses in the system. Three important
considerations would underpin their work. First, regulatory re-
43. See Council Directive No. 2001/24/EC. O.J. L 125, at 15 (2001) (discussing
reorganization and winding up of credit institutions); Council Directive No. 2001/17/
EC, O.J. L 110, at 28 (2001) (discussing reorganization and winding up of insurance
undertakings); Amended Proposal for a Thirteenth European Parliament and Council
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids, O.J. C. 378, at 10 (1997). The
adoption of the Investment Services Directive ("ISD") took five years of intensive nego-
tiations. Two directives governing the insolvency rules for insurance and credit institu-
tions were adopted in 2001, after fourteen and sixteen years, respectively, of negotia-
tions at Council and European Parliament levels. Finally, the proposed Take-over Di-
rective after more than twelve years of negotiations was rejected by the European
Parliament in July 2001. See infra nn.44-45 and the accompanying text.
44. General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle (Switzer-
land) from 1985 to 1993 and President of the European Monetary Institute (the prede-
cessor of the European Central Bank) from 1994 to 1997. The other appointed mem-
bers of the Committee were: Cornelius Herkstr6ter, former Chief Executive Officer
("CEO") of "Shell"; Luis Angel Rojo, former Governor of the Spanish Central Bank;
Bengt Ryden, former President of the Stockholm Stock Exchange; Luigi Spaventa, Pres-
ident of the Italian Securities Regulator ("CONSOB"); Norbert Walter, Director of Eco-
nomic Studies at Deutsche Bank; and Sir Nigel Wicks, former Chairman of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Committee.
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form should take place within the existing boundaries of the EC
Treaty, since any change would require an intergovernmental
conference of all Member States and thus definitively rule out
the timetable established in the FSAP. Second, the Committee
of Wise Men themselves decided that it would be premature to
consider a possible single European Securities Regulator, per-
haps along the lines of the U.S. Securities and Exchanges Com-
mission, since it would raise complex and politically controver-
sial issues and would certainly not be achievable before the
FSAP's 2005 deadline.45 A third important consideration arose
from the need to maintain the delicate institutional balance be-
tween the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and
the European Commission. As discussed above, legislative power
is entrusted to both, the Council and the Parliament, while exec-
utive powers (and hence, comitology powers) are fully in the
hands of the Council, which it may sub-delegate to the Commis-
sion under the detailed conditions defined by the Council alone.
Among these conditions is the possibility given to the Council -
but only to the Council - to block the adoption of implement-
ing rules by the Commission. Thus, the Parliament is involved in
the co-decision procedure in defining the implementing powers
conferred on the Commission but has no power to control the
way these powers are exercised, provided they are exercised le-
gally. For these reasons, the Parliament has often been reluctant
to grant implementing powers in basic legislation. This issue of
parliamentary powers was to become of major importance when
the Committee's recommendations were made.
1. The Four Level Approach
The Committee concluded that the "challenges facing the
creation of'an integrated securities market in Europe are that
the basic legislation is not in place; that there is still insufficient
prioritization; that the present system cannot produce quickly or
flexibly enough the type of legislation that modern financial
markets require; and that inconsistent implementation is se-
verely handicapping the emergence of a pan-European mar-
45. See Comitology Report, supra n.22, at 33. The Committee also stated in its
report that if the four level approach was not successful: "it might be appropriate to
consider a Treaty change, including the creation of a single EU regulatory authority for
financial services generally in the Community." Id. at 41, sec. 5.
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ket."4 6 The Committee considered that regulatory reform was
necessary for the FSAP to be delivered on time. The Commit-
tee's central recommendation to deal with this set of problems
was a four-level regulatory approach.
a. Level One
Level one was defined as legislation adopted by the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council in their role as co-legislators
on a proposal of the European Commission. Consistent with
the Commission's subsequent Governance White Paper, level one
legislation would take the form of framework directives. Thus,
the European Parliament and the, Council would have to agree
on the basic policy options, but would not need to reach agree-
ment on every technical detail. This would allow the entire pro-
cess for securing agreement under co-decision to be accelerated.
Technical adaptation of Community securities legislation would
no longer need to pass through a full co-decision procedure.
There were no recommendations as to the boundaries between
framework legislation at level one and technical implementing
rules at level two. Instead, the Committee opted for a pragmatic
and evolutionary path leaving responsibility for agreeing that de-
cision to the co-legislators.47
b. Level Two
The objective of the second legislative layer was to fill in the
technical details of the level one framework legislation. The Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council would in each directive
agree by co-decision to confer implementing powers on the Eu-
ropean Commission. The Commission would draft implement-
ing rules, having consulted an independent advisory committee
of national securities regulators and the Committee of European
Securities Regulators ("CESR"), which was to be established
along the lines of the Forum of European Securities Committees
("FESCO"), created in 1997. Their advice would be based on
their day-to-day experience and expertise of complex securities
markets issues. When preparing its advice to the European
46. See id. at 18.
47. See id. at 20 (stating that "the substantive content of what should be delegated
to the Level 2 procedure would in every case be agreed by the Council of Ministers and
the European Parliament on the basis of the European Commission's Level I proposal.
This is a crucial point and a key democratic safeguard").
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Commission, CESR would consult market participants, consum-
ers (investors), and end users (security issuers) in a continuous
and open process, including through the use of the Internet.
The European Commission would assess the technical advice
submitted to it and draw up draft implementing rules. In accor-
dance with comitology rules, the Commission would formally
seek the views of national governments. For this purpose, a reg-
ulatory committee, the European Securities Committee ("ESC"),
was to be set up comprising representatives of Member States'
finance ministries. The Committee would serve as a forum for
feedback from Member States and would formally vote on Com-
mission proposals in conformity with the comitology decision.4"
Within the limits of the EC Treaty, the European Parliament was
to be kept informed of the work of the ESC and, in accordance
with the existing comitology framework, have a right of over-
sight. If draft implementing rules were considered as exceeding
the implementing powers provided for in level one legislation,
the Parliament could adopt a resolution stating that the Com-
mission had exceeded its powers and requiring the Commission
to re-examine its draft or state the reasons why it chose not to act
in conformity with the resolution.
c. Level Three
Levels one and two create binding Community law. At level
three, in addition to the technical advice given in response to
Commission mandates on implementing measures, the CESR
would have two further tasks: first, to improve consistency in the
day-to-day implementation of Community law; and second, to
achieve greater convergence of supervisory practices across all
EU Member States. Importantly, however, the level three activity
would not be legally binding; it could become mandatory only as
and when national legislation is passed. The Committee made
several recommendations as to how consistency among national
security regulators could be improved. Non-binding guidelines
could be agreed on with respect to administrative practices; joint
interpretive recommendations could be developed; a compari-
son and review of regulatory practices could be established in
order to define best practice throughout the EU; and periodic
"peer reviews" of administrative and regulatory practices in
48. See Council Decision No. 1999/468/EEC, OJ. L 184/23, at 5 (1999).
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Member States would be instigated, the results of which would
be reported to the Commission and European Securities Com-
mittee. These initiatives were not intended to substitute for
technical implementing rules adopted at level two but rather, to
complement them. Indeed, the central motivation of the Com-
mittee's level three recommendations was to achieve greater
convergence between national supervisory and regulatory prac-
tices. For the same reason, the Committee underlined the im-
portance of each Member State identifying a single national reg-
ulator.
d. Level Four
Traditionally, the role of the European Commission as a
"guardian of the Treaty" has been to enforce existing Commu-
nity law, ultimately with the option of initiating infringement
procedures against Member States who fail to comply with Com-
munity law. Such cases might be relatively straightforward (for
example, the non- or partial, transposition of Community direc-
tives)." However, complex cases are more frequent (as when
national law or national administrative practices contradict Com-
munity directives or the fundamental freedoms of establish-
ment;50 services; 51 and capital under the EC Treaty). 52 Infringe-
ment procedures against a Member State have, to a great extent,
depended on a complaint by the private sector. The Committee
argued that in the future, and without prejudice to the Commis-
sion's responsibilities, national regulators should play a more
prominent role in ensuring that legitimate market access be-
comes a reality and that effective investor protection be en-
forced.
2. Next Steps
The Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men had no
legal status: implementing its recommendations depended, ulti-
mately, on an agreement between the three European Institu-
tions. Each reacted in different ways. The Council lent its over-
49. See Luxembourg v. Commission, Case C 430/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4-5 (discussing
partial non-transposition of ISD).
50. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.4, art. 43, O.J. C 340/10, at 57 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 61 (ex art. 52).
51. See id. art. 49, O.J. C 340/10, at 195 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 57 (ex art. 59).
52. See id. art. 56, OJ. C 340/10, at 199 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 61 (ex art. 73b).
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all political support, but sought to add a "braking mechanism"
on the cosmetology process with respect to what it described as
"particularly sensitive issues." The European Commission was
very positively disposed towards the Committee's proposals but
increasingly became embroiled in the institutional disagreement
that resulted from the response of the Council and the Parlia-
ment. For, indeed, it was the European Parliament that had per-
haps the most fundamental concerns, notably relating to the
Committee's recommendations with respect to level two mea-
sures.
a. The "Braking Mechanism"
When, in the Stockholm Resolution, the Council accepted
the four level approach as a way of achieving a more effective
securities market regulation in the EU, it did so by seeking to
reinforce the role of Member States at the stage when the Com-
mission prepares level two implementing rules.53 In this respect,
the Stockholm Resolution noted that "the Commission has com-
mitted itself, in order to find a balanced solution for those cases
of implementing measures in the field of securities markets ac-
knowledged in the light of discussions to be particularly sensi-
tive, to avoid going against predominant views which might
emerge within the Council as to the appropriateness of such
measures."54 The significance of this sentence is explained by
the procedure for adopting implementing measures. It is the
Commission's responsibility to formally prepare draft-imple-
menting measures and to submit them to the ESC. The ESC
must approve those measures by qualified majority55 in the ab-
sence of which, the Commission shall refrain from adopting an
implementing measure but instead, submit56 it to the Council of
Ministers. The Council of Ministers could either adopt the mea-
53. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2001
BROAD ECONOMIC POLICY GUIDELINES (2001). Full text of the report is available at http:/
/europa.eu.int/comm/economyjfinance/publications/european-economy/imple-
ment200 _en.htm.
54. See Stockholm European Council, Resolution on More Effective Securities Market
Regulation (March 23, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
55. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.4, art. 205, O.J. C 340/10, at 264-65
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 126-27 (ex art. 148) (stating that votes that Member States' repre-
sentatives cast in the European Securities Committee should be weighted in the future
in the same way as in the Council of Ministers).
56. See Council Decision No. 1999/468/EC, O.J. L 184/23, at 23 (1999).
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sure or again, oppose the draft by a qualified majority. However,
in the absence of a decision to adopt or oppose the measures
within a period of three months, the Commission could in prin-
ciple adopt the draft implementing measures. It is likely in such
circumstances that a decision would usually be taken along the
lines proposed by the Commission. Member States would have
to find a qualified majority within the Council to block a draft
implementing measure. It is here that the wording of the Stock-
holm Resolution becomes important. The Council could, in the
case of "potentially sensitive matters", oppose the Commission's
draft implementing measures with only a simple majority of
Member States, despite the Commission's legal entitlement to
adopt the measures. However, the Stockholm Resolution does
not define what type of measure falls within the category of "po-
tentially sensitive matters," specifying only that, on a case-by-case
basis, the Council and Commission must agree on their defini-
tion.
b. The European Parliament's Reaction
In the Stockholm Resolution, Heads of State and Govern-
ment recalled the institutional role attributed to the European
Parliament. The existing comitology requirements were stated:
the requirement for regular information from the Commission
to the European Parliament and its right of oversight to verify if
the European Commission has exceeded its powers in relation to
particular draft-implementing measures. As noted above, the
Parliament was not given the power to block the adoption of
implementing rules. Certain members of the European Parlia-
ment immediately expressed their reservations about the Stock-
holm Resolution arguing that it disturbed the institutional bal-
ance of powers. While the idea of regulatory reform to acceler-
ate the decision-taking process was endorsed, there were
concerns about the exact level two model proposed by the Com-
mittee, and with regard to its own control powers in the process.
The European Parliament, therefore, looked for equivalent pow-
ers to the Council arguing that if the Council were able to exer-
cise "control" on the Commission (including the right effectively
to block the adoption of implementing rules at level two), the
Parliament also wanted that power." The Parliament argued
57. See European Parliament, Resolution on the Final Report of the Committee of Wise
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that following a resolution opposing the contents of particular
implementing rules at level two, the Commission should commit
itself to withdrawing the draft and submitting a new proposal
under the co-decision procedure. Such a "call back" provision
would have impinged on the Commission's right of initiative,
disturbed the institutional balance, and thus put into question
the basis on which the Committee had made their recommenda-
tion. It would also have required changes to the "hard core" of
the comitology framework (in particular the Comitology Deci-
sion).
c. The Commission's Position
The Commission had reacted positively to the Committee's
recommendations and had urged their speedy adoption to allow
work to proceed quickly. The European Commission quickly
adopted Decisions by which the two Committees proposed in the
Committee's Report were established.5" For level two actions,
the ESC is comprised of high-level representatives of the Minis-
tries of Finance under Commission chairmanship and a Com-
mission-staffed secretariat. It will assume its regulatory functions
under the comitology framework only when the relevant (level
r5 one) directives are adopted in co-decision procedure (Pro-
spectuses and Market Abuse are at an advanced stage). At pre-
sent, therefore, the ESC acts purely as an advisory committee to
the European Commission. For level three actions, the CESR
enjoys an independent status reflecting the fact that its members
- the national securities regulators - are also independent
within their respective EU Member States. The role of this (su-
pervisory level) Committee is to advise the Commission (either
at the Commission's request, or at the Committee's own initia-
tive), on the preparation of draft-implementing measures in the
field of securities legislation. The Commission is represented at
CESR meetings and participates in all its debates. The Commit-
tee is chaired by a Member State representative elected from
among its members.59 It has its own secretariat principally based
Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, O.J. C 343, at 43 (Dec. 5, 2001);
European Parliament, Resolutions, O.J. C 21 E, at 341 Uan. 24, 2001).
58. See Commission Decision No. 2001/52/EC, OJ. L 91, at 43 (2001) (establish-
ing Committee of European Securities Regulators). See also Commission Decision No.
2001/528/EC, O.J. L at 45 (2001) (establishing European Securities Committee).
59. See Committee of European Securities, Press Release, CESR/01-003, Septem-
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in Paris and it meets every three months. The Commission has
taken great care to ensure that, for its part, no change in the
institutional balance has resulted from the Stockholm Resolu-
tion. The Commission remained fully supportive of the idea of
an effective democratic control by the European Parliament on
behalf of the European citizens but recognized that a "call back"
disturbed the institutional balance and would require Treaty
changes. Indeed, the Commission's political sympathy for the
Parliament's position was clear and was later unequivocally un-
derlined in its Governance White Papey° calling for "adjustments
of the responsibilities of the Institutions, giving control of execu-
tive competence to the two legislative bodies" and for a modifica-
tion of the relevant comitology provision in the EC Treaty at the
next Inter-Governmental Conference. 6" It had quickly become
apparent that the Parliament's reaction would not allow early
progress and it fell to the Commission to enter into informal
(and subsequently formal) discussion, to seek to unblock the de-
bate. Discussions took place over nearly a year between Commis-
sioner Bolkestein (responsible for Internal Market and Taxation
issues) and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee
chairman, Mrs. Randzio-Plath. A final compromise emerged in
February 2002. The European Parliament did not secure the
right to "call back" level two measures but received institutional
safeguards from the Commission to preserve its position in fu-
ture institutional discussions. Commission President Romano
Prodi made a solemn declaration (recorded in the minutes of
the European Parliament) .62 The European Parliament subse-
quently adopted a "Resolution on the Implementation of Finan-
cial Services Legislation"63 based on the report of one of its
members, Karl von Wogau. The Council accepted the outcome
her 19, 2001), available at http://www.europefesco.org/vl/default.asp). The current
chair of the Committee is Mr. Arthur Docters van Leeuwen, Chairman of the Dutch
Securities Regulator (Autoriteit-Financiele Markten).
60. See Governance White Paper, supra n.23.
61. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.4, art. 202, O.J. C 340/3, at 264 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 126 (ex art. 145).
62. See European Parliament, Resolution on the Implementation of Financial Services
Legislation, P.E. 313.863/1, at 45 (2002). See also http://europa.eu.int/comm/inter-
nal_market/en/finances/general/02-44.htm (building on a previous letter of October
2, 2001 from Commissioner Bolkestein to Mrs. Randzio-Plath during their bilateral dis-
cussions).
63. See European Parliament, Resolution, P.E. 313.832/1, at 43 (2002).
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of these discussions. A key element of this compromise lay in a
so-called "sunset clause" to be inserted in each new financial ser-
vices directive. The Commission declared its readiness to accept
the Parliament's wish to time-limit the conferral of implement-
ing powers upon the Commission in each Directive that falls
under the new approach. The European Parliament will intro-
duce clauses (as it is entitled to do as co-legislator) by which the
Commission's powers will be limited to four years from the entry
into force of each relevant directive. However, the implement-
ing powers for the Commission will be renewable and any level
two measures already adopted will not be affected. The Euro-
pean Parliament can thus monitor whether the Commission re-
spects all its other commitments while clearly staking out its posi-
tion in the intergovernmental conference for a future right to
"call back" level two measures. The Commission confirmed "its
political willingness to endeavour that the Parliament benefits
from equivalent treatment" and signalled "its commitment to
take the utmost account of the Parliament's position and any
resolutions that it might adopt with regard to implementing
measures exceeding the implementing powers provided for" in
level one measures, as well as its "aim of reaching a balanced
solution in such cases." There is, however, no legal commitment
on behalf of the Commission to withdraw a draft-implementing
measure if the European Parliament does not agree with its con-
tents. The European Parliament will have three months after
the first transmission of draft-implementing measures to react.
(The Commission committed itself to sending the first draft of
implementing measures at the same time to the Parliament and
to the Member States ahead of a future ESC vote). The Commis-
sion also committed itself to full transparency with regard to the
European Parliament until the final adoption of level two mea-
sures under the comitology procedure and underlined the need
for wide public consultation before draft-implementing mea-
sures are drawn up. In practice, most consultations will be or-
ganized by CESR when consulting on the technical advice it will
give on level two measures. The establishment of a market par-
ticipants panel will reinforce this earlier, broader, and more sys-
tematic consultation by CESR.
C. State of Play
This understanding with the Parliament has undoubtedly
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greatly improved the political ambience and the prospects for
accelerating agreement on many FSAP initiatives. At the Barce-
lona Summit of Heads of State and Government in March 2002
the progress was welcomed and the implementation of the FSAP
and the achievement of fully integrated markets by 2003 were
again underlined.64 In addition, the European Parliament and
the Council of Economic and Finance Ministries were urged to
adopt, as early as possible in 2002, a number of important draft
Directives.65 The Commission, over the last twelve months, has
undertaken ten open consultations on various proposals includ-
ing two two-day hearings and two Internet-wide consultations on
the reform of the ISD6 6 and reform of transparency require-
ments for publicly traded companies.67 The two committees
(ESC and CESR) are now in operation. Informal requests for
technical advice on a wide range of issues have been made to
CESR by the Commission in order to allow more preparatory
time before formal mandates are issued following agreement of
the Prospectuses and Market Abuse directives. Most recently
however, perhaps the most important development has oc-
curred. A political agreement to broaden the approach applied
to securities to the whole financial services sector was agreed in
principle by the Commission and finance ministers.68 The posi-
tion of the European Parliament is not yet known. However,
64. See Barcelona European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 3, at
7 (2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
65. The proposals relating to Collateral (financial securities) (O.J. C 180 E/
26.6.2001; COM (2001) 168); Market Abuse (O.J. C 240 E/28.8.2001; COM (2001)
281); Distance Marketing of Financial Services (O.J. C 385/11.12.1998; COM (1998)
468), Financial Conglomerates (O.J. C 213 E/31.7.2001; COM (2001) 213); Prospec-
tuses (O.J. C 240 E/28.8.2001; COM (2001) 280; O.J. C 272/1.9.1998; COM (1998)
451); Pension Funds (O.J. C 96 E/27.3.2001; COM (2000) 507; and the International
Accounting Standards Regulation (O.J. C 154 E/29.5.2001; COM (2001) 80.
66. The entire consultation process can be found on the website of the Directorate
General for the Internal Market at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en/
finances/mobil/isd/index.htm
67. Council Directive No. 2001/34/EC, O.J. L 184, at 1 (2001) (concerning the
admission to official stock exchange listing and information to be published on securi-
ties). This directive codified - without amending anything in the substance of the
provisions - two directives: Council Directive No. 82/121, art. 48 (1982) (regarding
information to be published on a regular basis by companies the shares of which have
been admitted to official stock-exchange listing) and Council Directive No. 88/627, art.
348, at 62 (1988) (concerning information to be published when a major holding in a
listed company is acquired or disposed of).
68. Agreed by Ministers in the Ecofin Council on July 12, 2002. See What's New on
Europa?, at http://europa.eu.int/geninfo/whatwasnew/072002.htm.
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work is now underway to consider the changes that will be
needed to the EU's present committee structures.6" Final deci-
sions on this work are expected in the next few months.
CONCLUSION
The progress made over the past two or three years both, in
relation to the procedural arrangements and the implementa-
tion of the FSAP, has been remarkable. How effectively the four
level approach is, will be monitored by a recently established in-
ter-institutional group.7 ° Significant reform has been possible
despite the need to remain within the present Treaty framework.
Indeed, the discussions themselves and the arrangements that
have been agreed to may have helped pave the way for institu-
tional changes to be made at the next Intergovernmental Con-
ference in 2004. The recent moves to extend the four level ap-
proach to other financial services sectors tend to confirm this
view even though, at the time of writing, the debate is not yet
concluded nor have discussions begun with the European Parlia-
ment which may well recall their earlier institutional concerns.
What is undeniable is that, without profound changes to the way
the EU legislates in the financial services sector, the burden of
outdated legislation and slow-moving procedural arrangements
remains. This will undoubtedly inhibit the Union's progress to-
ward its ambition of greater economic integration and toward
becoming the most competitive economy in the world.
69. Discussions are taking place within the Economic and Finance Committee
structure.
70. See supra n.68.
